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Explaining the Red Guard Movement During the Cultural Revolution 
 
 Chairman Mao first initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 in order to 
expel capitalist influences within the Party and solidify his position as the supreme leader of 
China.  In his “16 Points,” Mao called on the masses and youth of China to rise up and “strike at 
the handful of ultra-reactionary bourgeois Rightists and counter-revolutionary revisionists, and 
expose and criticize to the full their crimes against the Party, against socialism, and against Mao 
Tse-tung’s thought” (Decision of the central committee of the communist party of China 
concerning the great proletarian cultural revolution, 1966).  Almost immediately, students in 
middle schools, high schools, and universities across the country formed revolutionary groups 
known as the Red Guards in order to carry out Mao’s revolution.  What soon followed from 1966 
to 1969, however, was anarchy, as fighting between the Red Guards and state-appointed work 
teams sent by Premier Liu Shaoqi to lead the Cultural Revolution in the schools, factionalism 
between conservative and radical Red Guard organizations, and attacks by students on fellow 
citizens resulted in massive purges, beatings, and armed conflict.  Infighting among the Party 
elite also contributed to this sense of mass confusion.  Once set loose by the elite the Red Guards 
brought China into chaos, forcing the government to periodically suppress various Red Guard 
factions despite having previously supported them. 
 With such a confusing time period, scholars and participants in the Cultural Revolution 
have attempted to explain the factors that contributed to the Red Guards’ formation, 
factionalism, and violent conflict by analyzing the motivations of both the Red Guards and the 
Party elite and the social and political conditions that existed in China.  This paper will show that 
there are observable trends in the types and complexity of theories about the Red Guard 
movement developed during a given time period.  Specifically, these theories have been 
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influenced and shaped by their distance from the events of the Cultural Revolution and the 
availability of previously suppressed or unknown information.  Thus, it is important to view the 
literature on the Red Guard movement in the context of the time period during which is was 
written and the material and previous research available at that time, as such factors have 
affected the way scholars interpret the Red Guard movement and the relative strength of their 
arguments.   
   Immediately during and following the Cultural Revolution, Western accounts of the Red 
Guards often reflected the confusion of the times and simply attempted to document and make 
sense of the constantly changing events, while the Chinese government attempted to highlight 
the positive aspects of the Red Guards and their unity under the direction of Mao.  After 1978, 
however, scholars developed broader holistic theories to explain the social, political, and 
ideological roots of the Red Guard movement, using new evidence and their temporal distance 
from the Cultural Revolution to reflect on and provide greater coherency to the Red Guard 
movement on a broader scale.  At the same time, former Red Guards finally began to write about 
their experiences and involvement in the Red Guard movement, detailing what it was like to 
participate in the Cultural Revolution firsthand.  This new genre of “scar” literature was used by 
these Red Guards to exorcise their demons, cast blame, apologize for their own actions, and 
release the pent up emotions they had suppressed for decades, and as a result these accounts 
provided a valuable insight into the individual experience of being a Red Guard.  In the last 
decade, scholars have further developed these past theories and have begun to provide fuller 
analyses of the Red Guard movement, recognizing the complex confluence of factors that 
contributed to the Red Guard movement.  The body of literature on the Red Guards still lacks 
more complete explanations of the movement, however, and further research is needed to include 
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psychological analyses at the individual and societal level and to synthesize the entire existing 
body of literature on the Red Guard movement, as no one theory or factor can fully explain the 
complexities and chaos of the Red Guard movement.  Nevertheless, much like the existing 
literature, this new research will likely emerge with time, the continued ability to reflect on and 
analyze the movement with new evidence that comes to light, and the desire to even better 
understand the complexities of the Red Guard movement. 
1966-1971: Documenting the Red Guards During the Cultural Revolution 
 Confusion and a desire to make sense of the actions and motivations of the Red Guards 
predominated the literature written during the Cultural Revolution.  Scholars who studied the 
Red Guard movement during the Cultural Revolution largely focused on summarizing the 
events, and any analyses largely focused on the role of Mao and the Party leaders in shaping the 
Red Guard movement.  This is largely due to the dearth of information and primary sources 
available to scholars at the time, as scholars were trying to piece together the events while they 
happened.  In the end, the only sources of information available to scholars at the time were 
Western reporters on the ground or official Chinese government publications (a highly unreliable 
source for accurately portraying the movement).  Scholars during this period largely portrayed 
Mao as the leading figure directing the Red Guard movement, as Western scholars recognized 
that he was seeking to reassert his power in the Party hierarchy and eliminate his opponents 
(particularly Liu Shaoqi) by branding them as “counterrevolutionaries.”  As Bridgham (1971) 
notes, by offering his support for the newly formed Red Guard organizations and directly giving 
them leadership over carrying out the Cultural Revolution, Mao was able to bypass the Party 
structure and attack it directly, using the Red Guards for his own purposes.    
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 Once Mao unleashed the Red Guards, however, the movement took on its own force and 
soon resulted in anarchy across China.  As Bridgham notes, Mao’s efforts to dismantle the party 
“had succeeded too well, destroying the Party and government control apparatus without 
providing an effective substitute,” and as a result he needed to punish the radical Red Guards 
who were leading the chaos (and whom Mao had formerly supported), claiming they were guilty 
of “sectarianism” and “splittism” (Bridgham, 1971, 125-126).  Furthermore, scholars 
documented Mao’s constantly contradictory positions during the following two years, as he 
would alternately support the radical Red Guards and then suppress them using the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), and by the end of 1968 the government (now under Mao’s control) had 
returned to a conservative stance and used the PLA to suppress the radical Red Guards (Baum, 
1971).  Thus, it is clear that scholars writing during the Cultural Revolution focused almost 
exclusively on Mao as the primary figure both propelling and restricting the Red Guard 
movement.  Due to the lack of information about the complexities of the events, it seems that 
these scholars decided that the easiest explanation, in this case Mao’s personal involvement, was 
the best.  While Mao certainly played a large role, it is now clear that many other factors besides 
Mao’s leadership fostered the Red Guard movement. 
 In contrast to Western scholarship, the Party’s accounts of the Red Guard movement 
were colored by the ideological and political biases of the government, as they sought to 
maintain their power.  Thus, Party publications shifted their positions depending on the political 
climate that existed at the current time.  State publications such as Renmin Ribao and Hongqi 
articulated the government’s attitude (more specifically, Mao’s attitude) toward the Red Guards 
at any given moment.  At all times, however, these articles highlighted Chairman Mao as the sole 
source of leadership and ideological thought (Renmin Ribao, January 27, 1967, 13).  This may 
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help explain why early scholars focused on Mao’s role, as it is clear that the Party wanted to 
portray Mao as the leader of the Red Guard movement and that his word was law.  As a result, 
Western scholars believed that Mao was behind every part of the Red Guard movement and their 
research was influenced by the Party’s accounts.   
 In early 1967, the articles were highly supportive of the radical Red Guards, indicating 
that “they have the best understanding of the current great proletarian Cultural Revolution 
initiated and led by Chairman Mao himself” (Wenhui Bao, January 27, 1967, 17).  Yet even by 
February 1967, state publications radically shifted their position and denounced the actions of the 
radical Red Guards.  Instead of supporting the Red Guards, the publications emphasized the 
importance of the “three-in-one” policy of creating alliances between the PLA, the revolutionary 
cadres, and the Red Guards, as the party attempted to reassert control over the country using the 
military (Renmin Ribao, February 17, 1967).  This new position reflected the change in Mao’s 
approach to the Cultural Revolution at the time, as after the January Revolution of 1967 he 
stopped supporting his previously favored radical Red Guards, calling for an end to the violence 
and a return to order.  It is clear that the PLA was favored in this arrangement, as the PLA was 
portrayed as Mao’s personal vanguard and “the firm and solid cornerstone of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat,” and Red Guards were urged to “have faith in and rely on the People’s Liberation 
Army” (Renmin Ribao, February 17, 1967, 18; Hongqi, September 1, 1967, 5), thus legitimizing 
the Party’s assertion of control using the PLA.   
 Throughout the remainder of 1967 and 1968, the state publications largely reflected this 
more conservative line of supporting the PLA, articulating Mao’s disapproval of Red Guard 
factionalism and calling for unity and reeducation.  Rather than promoting violence and 
factionalism, the government instructed the Red Guards to “[unite] under the great banner of 
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Mao Tse-tung’s thought,” and encouraged reeducation for radical revolutionaries who had 
strayed away from the goals of the Cultural Revolution in order to “eradicate all sorts of non-
proletarian ideas and raise their ideological and political level” (Hongqi, September 22, 1967, 5; 
Renmin Ribao, October 20, 1967, 22).  While this reflected Mao’s conservative approach, the 
government portrayed these changes in a positive light by stressing the importance of unity and 
education rather than addressing the government’s violent suppression of the radicals.  Instead of 
admitting to the contradicting opinions of Mao, the government simply portrayed the radical Red 
Guards as counterrevolutionaries who had strayed from the true path of the Cultural Revolution 
and thus required reeducation.  Such views simultaneously legitimized Mao’s control of the 
government and his use of the PLA to crack down on the radical Red Guards, as such measures 
were “necessary” for maintaining social order and carrying out the Cultural Revolution 
“correctly.”  Thus, the Party publications served the best interests of Mao and the Party by 
stressing his benevolence and omnipotence in calling for an end to Red Guard radicalism so as to 
preserve order and continue the Revolution. 
 It is interesting to note that almost no articles about the Red Guards can be found in 1969 
publications, reflecting the government’s further shift away from supporting the Red Guard 
movement.  Instead, criticisms of the “big scab” and “mortal foe of the working class,” Liu 
Shaoqi, and portrayals of the Soviet Union as revisionists threatening the advancement of 
communism were the predominant themes in the state publications (Hsiang-tung, 1969, 12; 
Renmin Ribao, March 21, 1969, 6).  In fact, Liu Shaoqi was largely blamed for suppressing the 
radical Red Guards, as Mao’s government claimed that Shaoqi had “cruelly repress[ed] the 
revolutionary movement of the student youth” (Piao, 1969).  By shifting away from the issues of 
Red Guard radicalism and factionalism, it seems that the government was trying to assert Mao’s 
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control over the government by unifying China against the “true” enemies of communism.  By 
branding Liu Shaoqi as a traitor, Mao was able to place blame on him for unpopular policies that 
in fact had been instituted by Mao himself, and using state publications to attack both Shaoqi and 
the Soviet Union was a useful rhetorical strategy that diverted public attention away from the 
horrors of the Red Guard movement.  By largely ignoring the Red Guards, Mao was better able 
to consolidate his control of the government, popular appeal, and ideological supremacy, as Lin 
Biao clearly indicated that “the Communist Party of China owes all its achievement to the wise 
leadership of Chairman Mao and these achievements constitute victories for Mao Tse-tung 
Thought” (Piao, 1969, 186).  In the end, the government’s version of the Red Guard movement 
was designed to merely reinforce the Party line rather than provide in-depth examinations of why 
the Red Guard movement occurred, simply laying the blame for its failure on Shaoqi and his 
“rightist” clique instead.  
1978-1992: Piecing Together the Cultural Revolution 
 In the decade following the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the scholarly 
literature on the Red Guard movement took a more holistic approach in developing explanations 
for the events, as scholars had now had the opportunity to reflect on the Red Guard movement 
with hindsight and new sources of information.  Two dominant and opposing theories were 
developed to explain how the Red Guard movement originated and who directed their actions.  
While each theory has its own complexities, the debate between these theories was largely 
concerned with whether the actions of the Red Guards were the result of political factors in the 
party elite or due to existing social antagonisms between classes. 
 The first major approach was a political theory developed by Lee (1978), who argues that 
the Red Guard movement was a manifestation of elite conflict within the upper ranks of the 
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Party.  Lee argues that the actions of the Red Guards were primarily the result of political 
maneuvering between the Party leaders (i.e. Mao versus Liu Shaoqi), and that Red Guard 
factionalism “reflected the continuing intra-elite conflict that simply reappeared at the mass level 
under the new rule of ‘freely mobilizing the masses’” along radical-conservative lines (Lee, 
1978, 64).  This struggle centered around the different ideological views of the seat of power—
Liu Shaoqi saw the Party as the definer of communist ideology (and was thus interested in 
preserving the current organizational hierarchy) with class defined by economic factors, while 
Mao believed that the masses should define the ideology of the party and that class should be 
defined by political factors such as good political performance and dedication to the Party.  This 
conflict was crucial, Lee argues, as Mao had replaced “‘structural legitimacy’ with ideological 
legitimacy,” and while the Party attempted to appease Mao’s calls for rectification within the 
Party in the early stages of the Red Guard movement, the Party was still largely “protecting its 
own personnel and its own ‘structural legitimacy’” (Lee, 1978, 44, 58).  The Red Guards simply 
reflected this divide among the elite, as “those from bourgeois and other ‘bad’ families saw an 
opportunity in the political definition of ‘class’ to enhance their political position, while the 
economic interpretation of ‘class’ served the political interests of the children of cadres” (Lee, 
1978, 77).   
 As the Red Guards were given more freedom to act according to their own interests, the 
“intra-elite conflict changed from an inner-Party struggle to an open competition [between the 
Party leaders]” that Lee argues inevitably led to the manipulation of the Red Guards by the Party 
elite (Lee, 1978, 107).  Both the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the Shaoqi’s Party 
organization actively manipulated the guards, such as in Premier Zhou Enlai’s creation of the 
student-run “Case Group 28” that was told to find evidence that could be used to expose Liu 
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Shaoqi as a traitor and depose him, a clear case of the Party elite manipulating the student masses 
(Schoenhals, 2008).  Such incidents, along with Mao’s method of “allow[ing] or even 
promot[ing] conflict among groups, and then interven[ing] personally at a decisive and critical 
moment,” Lee argues, display how the elite “exploited the freedom of the masses by 
manipulating them to oppose a particular policy, to attack a particular group, or to mount 
pressure on Mao” (Lee, 1978, 345).  The elite initiated even the return to conservatism, Lee 
(1978) argues, as it was in the PLA’s best interest to quell radical Red Guard groups in order to 
maintain the PLA’s structural legitimacy.  While Lee’s arguments provide sound evidence for 
the role of the elite in guiding the Red Guard movement, his theory falls short of acknowledging 
the free choice of the individual Red Guards to participate in the movement and join various 
factions.  While he does recognize that once the elite initiated the Red Guard movement it 
quickly became mass driven, the Red Guards are still largely portrayed as pawns of the elite with 
little personal motivation or freedom to engage in the conflict.  Thus, Lee’s argument remains 
fairly elite-centric, similar to accounts written during the Cultural Revolution that focused on 
Mao as the primary director of the Red Guard movement. 
 Chan, Rosen, and Unger (1980) proposed an alternative theory to Lee’s (1978), claiming 
that social factors best explained the emergence of Red Guard factionalism.  Specifically, Chan 
et al. (1980) argue that Red Guard factionalism (and the subsequent infighting and violence) was 
the product of existing class antagonisms that existed between students of “good-class origins” 
(e.g. children of cadres and working-class peasants) and students of “middle-class origins” (e.g. 
children of the intelligentsia and non-intelligentsia middle class), not due to conflict among the 
elite.  While the good-class Red Guards (the conservative faction) favored class origins as the 
measure that should be used to determine future success in the Party, the middle-class Red 
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Guards (the radical faction) favored using political performance.  Once the Cultural Revolution 
was initiated, Chan et al. (1980) argue that the Red Guards factionalized down these existing 
class lines, seeking to advance their interests of either preserving the current social order 
(conservatives) or advancing their current status (radicals).  Thus, rather than simply reflecting 
elite conflicts, the Red Guard movement was the result of previously existing social antagonisms 
that turned into more violent and oppressive attempts to advance one’s position and obtain 
revenge against the other classes for past injuries once they were given the power to do so.  The 
researchers use retrospective survey evidence to support their conclusion that factional affiliation 
in Canton largely fell along class lines during the Red Guard movement.  Thus, according to this 
theory, the Red Guards had clear personal and class motivations for allying with their particular 
factions.  Chan et al.’s arguments provide a convincing and more mass-centered approach to the 
Red Guard movement than does Lee (1978), although it still fails to completely appreciate the 
role of the individual.  Nevertheless, both theories remain incomplete, as neither addresses the 
complexity and interrelatedness of political and social factors.  In the next generation of scholars, 
these theories continued to be developed and synthesized to provide even more complex 
accounts of the Red Guard movement. 
 After this initial wave of scholarly literature on the Cultural Revolution, former Red 
Guards finally began to write about their experiences during the Cultural Revolution, providing a 
new individualistic perspective on the events.  It seems that with distance from their participation 
in the Cultural Revolution and time to reflect on their actions, these Red Guards were finally able 
to (and needed to) express their feelings, cast blame, and bring their demons to light to share 
with the world.  While these sources are quite candid and there is much reason to believe that the 
majority of the material is accurate, it is important to recognize that these accounts are reflections 
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on their experiences, not diaries.  As a result, the authors may have painted themselves in a better 
light, and some of the insights that they claimed to have had during their experiences may have 
actually been the result of their personal reflections during the two decades separating the onset 
of the Cultural Revolution and writing these accounts.  Nevertheless, these sources provide a 
wealth of information that put in perspective what it was like to be a Red Guard and live through 
the Cultural Revolution, and help to articulate the personal feelings and motivations for 
participating in the movement that many Red Guards experienced.  As a result, it is possible to 
begin to understand the personal factors behind the activity of the Red Guards, providing a 
further wealth of information not provided by the holistic theories of Red Guard activity 
developed in the decade after the Cultural Revolution. 
 Liang Heng and Zhai Zhenhua were both Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in 
their middle schools in Changsha and Beijing, respectively.  Both indicate that initially, many of 
the Red Guards’ activities were the result of pure devotion to Mao, although there was also a 
strong sense of confusion among the Red Guards.  Heng highlights that, at least initially, Mao’s 
calls to carry out the revolution were inspiring, and he felt “a sense of great responsibility to the 
Party” and became determined to participate in the movement (Heng & Shapiro, 1983, 42).  
There certainly existed a strong fervor to support Mao, as the Nankai University Red Guards 
proudly stated that they would “defend Chairman Mao…[and] the Great Mao Zedong Thought to 
the death” (Red Guard, 2010).  This blind faith in Mao and the Party created a mass fervor in 
which any action that carried out Mao’s will was permissible, as one Red Guard indicated 
retrospectively that many Guards believed “it [was] no problem if a dozen traitors or spies 
[died]” in the process of eradicating counterrevolutionaries (Office of the Party Committee, 
Shijiazhuang Region & Office Committee, Hebei Province, ed., 2010).  While the creation of 
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character posters and criticisms of teachers and other “traitors” was “an exciting process,” Heng 
expressed his confusion about the events, as “it seemed that every day good people were exposed 
as evil ones lurking behind Revolutionary masks.  Friendly people were hidden serpents, 
Revolutionaries became counterrevolutionaries…it was confusing because the changes came so 
fast” (Heng & Shapiro, 1983, 45).  Zhenhua also expressed her confusion, as she was unsure of 
whether or not to join the Red Guards, and she notes that while it seemed that seemed nobody 
knew what a Red Guard was or was supposed to do, “everybody believed it was good to be a 
Red Guard” (Zhenhua, 1992, 75).  Thus, despite their confusion, youths such as Zhenhua and 
Heng felt compelled to join the Red Guards due to societal pressure and a sense of duty to 
Chairman Mao. 
 These accounts also suggest that personal motivations played a role in the actions of the 
Red Guards.  Revenge seems to have been a common and powerful motivator for many Red 
Guards, as Heng notes that he “resented the teachers who had controlled and criticized [him] for 
so long, and [he] looked forward to a little revenge” for being shunned as the son of a “Rightist;” 
even at home Liang wanted to act out because he was “tired of being controlled so tightly” 
(Heng & Shapiro, 1983, 46, 48).  This is a crucial insight into the psychology of the Red Guards, 
as the Red Guards were suddenly told to rebel against their elders and superiors, contrary to the 
traditional societal expectations of obedience to the older generation.  The sudden power the Red 
Guards possessed was intoxicating, as Zhenhua (1992) indicates she had enjoyed criticizing 
other students and teachers and controlling her classmates’ education after many teachers had 
been removed from their positions.  It is likely that the desire for revenge against other 
classmates and adults helped propel the intensity of the Red Guard movement that eventually 
turned their anger into violent “struggle sessions,” home raids, and armed conflict between Red 
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Guard factions.  Zhenhua admits that with her power as a leader in her Red Guard movement, 
she might have caused an old woman’s death, as her team mercilessly beat the woman during a 
home raid (Zhenhua, 1992, 97).  As Heng notes, such activities were incidents of “ordinary 
people [who] were at last taking their revenge—rightfully, no doubt—on that collection of 
toadies, model workers, people with good political performances, and Party members” (Heng & 
Shapiro, 1983, 131).  Nevertheless, such incidents were also frightening to participants such as 
Zhenhua and Heng, as they witnessed (and at times participated in) the sheer chaos and violence 
that tore apart their communities until Mao called for a cease-fire in February of 1967 (Heng & 
Shapiro, 1982).  Many Red Guards became disillusioned and confused, as Heng notes that “it 
was during this gory climax that people began to realize that the Cultural Revolution would 
never make sense” (Heng & Shapiro, 1983, 133).  It is clear that both Heng and Zhenhua, while 
perhaps trying to justify their actions under the guise of punishing those who deserved it for 
treating them poorly prior to the Cultural Revolution, also used their accounts as a confession 
where they were finally able to admit their crimes as Red Guard.  In doing so, these accounts at 
some level represent a form of catharsis, as Heng and Zhenhua were finally able to relieve some 
of their guilt for their actions and finally publically express the emotions of participating in the 
Cultural Revolution. 
 At some level, however, Heng and Zhenhua recognized in their accounts that many Red 
Guards were simply trying to survive, as the rapidly changing positions of the government on the 
Red Guards’ actions and support for different factions required them to be ever alert to changing 
fortunes.  When Heng resisted criticizing his father at the orders of the work team, his father 
immediately berated him, saying: “How can you be so foolish?...Write something quickly.  Turn 
something in right away” (Heng & Shapiro, 1983, 65).  It is clear that Heng’s father was 
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concerned about Heng protecting himself from danger, as he told his children to “be careful what 
you say.  Never give your opinion on anything, even if you’re asked directly.  Just believe 
Chairman Mao’s words, they’re the only thing that seems reliable anymore” (Heng & Shapiro, 
1983, 76).  Furthermore, both Zhenhua and Heng recognized that the chaos was also the result of 
conflicts in the Party elite.  Heng noted:  
 The fortunes of the different factions were in the hands of others, and the Rebels who 
 were doing the beating today might themselves be beaten tomorrow.  It was as if 
 someone were playing games with us all, but there was no time to figure it out…the 
 action was too fast, and too much information was missing (Heng & Shapiro, 1983, 132). 
While it is not entirely clear how much of this insight is the product of the Heng’s reflection on 
the events or his actual thoughts at the time, it is conceivable that some Red Guards (particularly 
in urban areas) recognized at the time that the constantly changing position of the government 
was part of an elite conflict, and it highlights the feelings of confusion and chaos among many 
Red Guards.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the Red Guards’ experiences during this time were 
extremely confusing and that both internal and external factors contributed to their actions.   
 By recounting their personal stories, former Red Guards such as Heng and Zhenhua 
contributed an important addition to the literature on the Red Guard movement by explaining the 
individual’s experience in the movement, an important source of information often simplified 
and ignored in the more holistic theories of Lee (1978) and Chan et al (1980).  Nevertheless, it is 
clear from these accounts that the individual’s experience played an important role in their 
actions as Red Guards.  While recent research has not expressly focused on analyzing the 
individual’s experience (thus necessitating greater research in this area), in the last decade 
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researchers have begun to understand that the individual Red Guards played an important part in 
shaping and directing the movement. 
2002-The Present: New Directions in Research 
 In the past decade, with even more distance from the events of the Cultural Revolution 
and access to new evidence as the relationship between China and the United States has become 
more open, scholars have developed increasingly more complex analyses of the Red Guard 
movement, building upon earlier theories and identifying previously unexplored explanations for 
the causes and events of the Red Guard movement.  An example of this new evidence is 
demonstrated by Dong’s (2010) description of the June 2, 1966 uprising at the Liyang campus of 
Nanjing University, located in the countryside 60 miles outside of Nanjing.  This conflict was 
unique, the author argues, as student unrest was not connected with elite politics or social 
antagonisms at all, likely due to their isolation in the countryside away from urban areas.  
Instead, the student uprising was the result of intra-campus conflicts with university officials, 
primarily President Kuang Yaming.  Dong argues that students were dissatisfied with their living 
conditions, the difficulties of manual labor, and the abandonment of any academic studies, and 
they believed that Yaming “wanted to send the teachers and students down to the countryside to 
isolate them from the unfolding Cultural Revolution movement…[and] to keep them from 
participating in political studies and the revolutionary criticism campaign” (Dong, 2010, 38).  
Thus, the students’ revolutionary activity both before and after a brutal suppression by Yaming, 
in which he declared that all party secretaries and political instructors “must struggle against [the 
rebels] brutally, beat them down, and make them notorious,” was simply a product of the “self-
interested considerations” of the students (Dong, 2010, 40, 48).  Even Yaming’s actions were 
done in self-interest, as he thought that “the suppression of the dissidents would…be a vital test 
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of his administrative capability and organizational loyalty,” thus esteeming him in the eyes of 
Party leaders (Dong, 2010, 39).   
 By assessing the dynamics of the Liyang campus, Dong’s argument recognizes that 
individual incidents of Red Guard activity across China were caused by different factors, and in 
the case of Nanjing University the elite Party officials and class antagonisms played little role, in 
contrast to the expectations of Lee (1978) and Chan et al.’s (1980) theories.  Instead, Dong 
highlights that local interests likely played a role in many of the demonstrations, as the various 
parties sought to protect their self-interests.  This suggests that it is necessary to consider 
individual cases of student dissent separately rather than make broad assumptions about the 
factors that contributed to the Red Guard movement as being identical across the country.  As a 
result, Dong’s argument is an example of the evolution of scholarship on the Red Guards that 
begins to address the complexity of the Red Guard movement. 
 Several scholars have also expanded upon past theories and provide more complex 
analyses of the political, ideological, and social factors that contributed to the Red Guard 
movement.  Walder (2002) further developed the theory that the Red Guard movement had 
purely political roots beyond the argument proposed by Lee (1978).  First, he discounts Chan et 
al.’s (1980) theory that factionalism along class lines was present immediately following the 
beginning of the Red Guard movement by demonstrating that it wasn’t until September of 1966 
that factions exhibited distinct social compositions along class lines (Walder, 2002, 441).  
Instead, Walder argues that Red Guards initially factionalized according to whether they thought 
the work teams should control the direction of the Cultural Revolution in the schools.  This was 
largely due to the ambiguous circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, which led to confusion 
as students allied together based on what they thought was the “right” course of action.  The 
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more militant Red Guards from all social backgrounds were often the faction opposing the work 
teams, rather than being solely composed of children from middle-class backgrounds.  Thus, 
according to Walder, the Red Guards simply reacted to the rapidly changing political 
environment and pursued what they thought was the “right” course of action.   
 Unlike Lee (1978), however, Walder (2002) argues that Red Guard activity was not 
manipulated by the elite, but rather was propelled by the Red Guards themselves in response to 
the turbulent atmosphere the elite had created.  It was the confusion of the times, not 
manipulation by the elite, which drove Red Guard factionalism.  As a result, factions were not 
initially socially homogeneous, as students largely factionalized based on their support for (or 
opposition to) the work teams.  Walder’s argument thus provides a greater level of complexity to 
Lee’s argument, introducing the concept of the political atmosphere as the primary contributor to 
factionalism at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.  Nevertheless, Walder’s arguments are 
still strongly rooted in Lee’s political tradition, and as a result he fails to properly address the 
presence of social and individual factors in the Red Guard movement.  Xiaowei (2006) even 
further expanded on Walder’s arguments by suggesting that political opportunism and the 
political convictions of the Red Guards, primarily the leaders, also spurred the creation of 
factions.  Thus, Xiaowei adds another level of complexity to Walder’s argument by introducing 
ideology and individual convictions surrounding the Red Guard movement as a factor 
contributing to factionalism.  As this research suggests, scholars began to recognize that multiple 
factors that had been previously unexplored contributed to the development of Red Guard 
factionalism.  Thus, Xiaowei introduced an individualist perspective on the Red Guard 
movement by recognizing that personal convictions and ideology were important factors that 
helped propel the Red Guards’s actions. 
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 Some scholars, however, rejected the idea that the Red Guards were “rational actors” 
who were advancing their own interests.  Andreas (2007) argued that charismatic mobilization 
(i.e. the nature of Mao’s leadership through personality, ideology, and informal means) was more 
important in unifying and directing Red Guard activity.  Mao played the central role in directing 
the ideology of the Red Guards, as “political movements were always initiated by Mao” 
(Andreas, 2007, 440).  Nevertheless, ideology alone was not enough to propel the Red Guard 
movement, and instead the idea of informal leadership, in which Mao directly appealed to the 
Red Guard organizations in guiding their actions, was the primary device that unified the Red 
Guard organizations rather than direct control by the Party authorities.  While the Central 
Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRSG) was created to help direct Red Guard activity, 
Andreas argues that this organization only informally directed the activities of the Red Guards, 
as “no formal links existed between the CCRSG and the myriad local rebel organizations,” with 
the Red Guard hierarchy largely controlled by these local organizations that received inspiration 
and direction from Mao and his cohorts (Andreas, 2007, 450).  Andreas’s argument seems to be 
related to earlier theories that emerged during the Cultural Revolution that portrayed Mao as the 
guiding light of the Red Guard movement, representing a body of literature that further expanded 
upon the literature that emerged during the Cultural Revolution.  Other modern scholars such as 
Heberer (2009) also highlight the importance of Mao’s role in unleashing the Red Guards, 
allowing them to act freely while simultaneously carrying out Mao’s vision for the Cultural 
Revolution.  While these arguments for Mao’s role are strong, they fail to address the 
complexities of the Red Guard movement (much like the literature that these theories are based 
on) and thus discount other factors contributed to the Red Guard movement. 
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 Thus, as can be seen from the literature, most scholars during the last decade have further 
developed previously existing theories established both during the Cultural Revolution and in the 
decade following the Cultural Revolution, while also introducing new concepts that begin to 
recognize and address the complexities of the Red Guard movement.  Clearly, the ability of 
scholars to use new evidence and their distance from the events of the Cultural Revolution have 
allowed them to develop more complex theories that can better explain the multitude of factors 
that contributed to the Red Guard movement. 
Conclusion: Directions for Future Research 
 Despite the many advances in scholarship on the Red Guard movement, there are still 
many deficits in the existing literature.  The most notable problem is the lack of scholarship that 
focuses on the individual experiences of the Red Guards and the role of the individual and social 
psychological factors that heavily contributed to the movement.  While it is clear from "scar" 
literature that psychological factors such as individual perceptions of the events, idealism, 
devotion to Mao and the Party, and societal pressures all contributed to the actions of the Red 
Guards, scholars have largely ignored these factors.  While some scholars such as Andreas 
(2007) briefly touch on issues surrounding the experience of the individual, it is not the primary 
focus, and thus there is a need for further research on individual factors.  To examine individual 
psychological factors, it would be helpful to do a massive literature review on scar literature and 
autobiographies of Red Guards, which could help encapsulate what it was like as an individual to 
participate in the Red Guards.  As seen in Heng and Shapiro (1983) and Zhenhua (1992), these 
authors provide vivid accounts of their experiences and thoughts at the time, expressing 
confusion, devotion to the Party, the desire for revenge, and disillusionment with the Party.  
While holistic theories are helpful for providing a unifying framework to explain the Red Guard 
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movement, they fail to account for the experience of the individual, and instead lump all the Red 
Guards together into uniform factions that do not account for complex individual factors.   
 Furthermore, scholars have failed to explain how social factors and environments 
changed and influenced the individual’s behavior beyond the role that confusion played in 
influencing the Red Guards’ activities.  One valuable framework that can be used is Zimbardo’s 
(2007) analysis of his 1971 Stanford prison experiment, in which normal college students 
assigned to be “guards” used their power to abuse college students who had been assigned to be 
“prisoners.”  In analyzing this experiment, Zimbardo notes the importance of the “toxic impact 
of bad systems and bad situations in making good people behave in pathological ways that are 
alien to their nature” (Zimbardo, 2007, 195).  In situations where people are given uncontrolled 
power, such as during the Cultural Revolution, individuals act in ways they normally would not.  
Zimbardo himself notes the similarities between the prison experiment and the environments of 
Nazi rule in Germany, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and Abu Ghraib, in which normal 
individuals committed unspeakable acts of murder and torture, often against one’s own 
neighbors in Germany and Rwanda.  Similarities can also be seen in the Red Guards, as in the 
vacuum of state power and with the authority conveyed upon the Red Guards, these normal 
students suddenly engaged in brutal acts of torture, raiding, and homicide against their 
community members, fellow students, teachers, and state authorities.  It seems that the 
environment of the Cultural Revolution created by social antagonisms, political conflict at both 
the local and elite level, and lack of oversight formed a social system in which Red Guards were 
able to commit these acts in the fervor of the Cultural Revolution and devotion to Mao.   
 Zimbardo also notes that when individuals are given a sense of anonymity in their actions 
by conferring a power position above that of a normal citizen, such as was conferred upon the 
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Red Guards, people “can more easily be induced to behave in antisocial ways,” particularly when 
such actions are legitimized by popular ideology (Zimbardo, 2007, 219, 274).  This process is 
referred to as “deindividuation,” as individuals lose their self-awareness when they act in large 
groups.  Without the system that created the sense of power and anonymity among the Red 
Guards in the name of Mao’s thought, it is unlikely that these students would have become so 
deindividuated and engage in such unspeakable acts.  Thus, it is important for scholars to 
recognize that the social and political atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution not only affected 
the Red Guard movement as a whole, but it also had immense psychological effects on the 
individual Red Guards.  By utilizing individual and social psychological frameworks, scholars 
can enhance existing social and political theories by addressing how these societal and political 
factors affected the individual, and thus better explain how the events of the Red Guard 
movement were influenced by the psychological state of its participants. 
 Finally, future research needs to synthesize the entire existing body of literature on the 
Red Guards.  While all of the sources examined here provide compelling arguments for the 
factors that created and guided the Red Guard movement, each exists in isolation and does not 
integrate the many complex factors involved.  Thus, these sources are incomplete pictures of the 
movement when presented alone.  It seems that when the various political, social, and 
ideological theories proposed by these scholars are viewed in tandem, however, they provide a 
more complete account of the factors that contributed to the Red Guard movement.  Class 
antagonisms, personal motivations, ideology, political conflict at the elite and local level, the 
influence of Mao and the Party elite, and the psychological state of the movement’s participants 
all clearly played a part in the Red Guard movement, and it is only when all of these factors are 
addressed together that a full account of the Red Guard movement can be accurately presented.  
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Thus, future research should integrate these existing theories and attempt to determine to what 
extent each of these factors contributed to the course of the Red Guard movement at various 
points in time and in specific circumstances.  By expanding upon and synthesizing these existing 
theories, scholars will more accurately analyze and portray the complexity of the Red Guard 
movement. Only then can scholars truly begin to make sense of this tumultuous period and 
understand the many factors that created the chaos of the Red Guard movement during the 
Cultural Revolution, and in doing so help prevent such events from ever occurring again. 
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